Insights

In Iraq, opportunities don’t appear through public announcements or formal channels. They develop quietly — through activity on the ground, shifts in procurement behaviour, and changes in how contractors, suppliers, and regulators move in real time. This is why our approach to research is simple: focus on what people are doing, not what they are saying. Iraq’s infrastructure and energy sectors operate through signals: contractors increasing material orders ahead of a new proj

A few months ago, a European supplier asked me to look at a bid they were preparing for an Iraqi private-sector client. Big project. Multi-million dollar order. They were confident — good pricing, strong product, good reputation. When I opened their documents, I knew instantly they’d already lost. Not because their product was bad. Not because their price was high. Not because the client preferred someone else. They lost it in the most boring way possible: the way foreign sup

Most suppliers treat HS codes as a small administrative detail — something the freight forwarder picks, or whatever matches the catalogue. In Iraq, that approach is dangerous. A single wrong HS code can trigger: higher duties shipment reclassification inspection delays customs disputes late delivery penalties storage and demurrage payment delays complete rejection of the shipment Foreign suppliers don’t get caught because they act recklessly — they get caught because they und

Most foreign suppliers assume delivery failures happen because of logistics. They don’t. In Iraq, the number one cause of delays, penalties, and payment disputes is documentation non-conformity — minor-looking inconsistencies across the paperwork that customs officers, banks, or inspection agencies reject instantly. A shipment can be perfect. The packaging can be perfect. The transport can be perfect. But if a single detail on a document is wrong, unclear, unverified, or inc

Most foreign suppliers think delivery risk ends the moment their shipment reaches Iraq. It doesn’t. In Iraq, the highest-risk part of the entire delivery chain begins when the container hits the port. This is where customs, documentation, subcontractors, inspectors, banks, and project timelines all collide — and where contracts written for Europe or the Gulf fall apart instantly. Delivery risk in Iraq isn’t about shipping. It’s about everything that happens after shipping , a

Most foreign suppliers think Incoterms = full legal protection . They don’t. Incoterms were never designed to cover the realities of Iraq’s customs system, last-mile delivery risks, documentation requirements, or the delays that happen once cargo touches Iraqi soil. Yet suppliers routinely sign multimillion-dollar contracts assuming that choosing DAP, CIP, CFR, or EXW somehow protects them from: customs delays COO requirements HS code disputes conformity checks document mism

Most foreign suppliers entering Iraq assume the private sector behaves like the UK, EU, or Gulf. It doesn’t. The Iraqi private market has its own rhythms, risks, informal norms, and legal blind spots — and misunderstanding them can turn a simple procurement into a stalled project, a payment dispute, or a relationship-ending misunderstanding. After years of cross-border work between the UK and Iraq, the same misconceptions repeat themselves. Below are the most damaging legal m

Most projects in Iraq don’t fail on site, they fail on paper. Unrealistic tender assumptions, rushed pricing, and ignored logistics destroy margins before construction even begins. Winning the bid means nothing if it can’t be delivered.

Iraq’s renewable energy ambitions are impressive on paper, but without a reliable grid, they risk becoming stranded promises. As billions pour into solar and gas projects, the country still lacks the transmission and distribution backbone to move power where it’s needed. Real transition won’t come from megawatts announced. It’ll come from megawatts delivered.

Iraq’s biggest obstacle to rebuilding isn’t funding — it’s bureaucracy. Projects stall between ministries, paperwork, and approvals that outlast budgets. Until oversight turns into enablement, reconstruction will remain an ambition instead of an outcome.